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Rocket attacks on civilian and military targets, from both Hezbollah (South 
Lebanon)  and Hammas (Gaza strip) have been causing a major operational problem for 
the Israeli Defense Forces for over two decades. In recent years, U.S. forces are facing 
similar attacks in Afghanistan and Iraq against both remote military outposts and in the 
heart of Bagdad (“Green zone”). The insurgents are using mortars and short range 
rockets, whose launch platforms have very low signature prior to launch. The insurgents 
have adopted a "shoot and scoot" tactic making it hard to detect them in time to retaliate 
effectively. In this thesis we present a new analytic probability model, that addresses this 
tactical situation. The defender’s decision tradeoffs are explored and quantified. A new 
counter mortar/rocket tactic is suggested and explored using the probability model. An 
extended simulation model is developed to explore the situation when the defender is 
using a sensor that is subject to false positive detections. 
 
 vi
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................1 
II. THE COMBAT SITUATION AND ENGAGEMENT TACTICS..........................3 
A. CURRENT COMBAT SITUATION AND TACTICS.................................3 
B. SUGGESTED TACTIC AND WEAPON......................................................4 
C. SCENARIO ......................................................................................................5 
III. THE ANALYTIC MODEL - NO FALSE POSITIVES DETECTIONS................7 
A. GROUND SENSOR AND “DUMB” MISSILE ............................................8 
1. Assumption ...........................................................................................8 
2. Deriving the Model Equation..............................................................8 
3. Deriving ( )N k N kH t− − .............................................................................9 
3.1 First Case - Uniform Distributions ..........................................9 
3.2 Second Case – Normal Distributions .....................................11 
3.3 Third Case - Exponential Distributions .................................11 
4. Analysis ...............................................................................................12 
5. Tradeoff: Wait or Launch?...............................................................21 
B. GROUND SENSOR AND “SMART” MISSILE........................................27 
1. Assumptions .......................................................................................27 
2. Ground Sensor Guided “Smart” Missile (Method 1) .....................28 
3. Onboard Sensor “Smart” Missile (Method 2).................................36 
IV. THE CASE OF FALSE POSITIVE DETECTIONS - A SIMULATION 
MODEL ......................................................................................................................47 
A. INTRODUCING FALSE DETECTIONS ...................................................47 
1. Assumptions .......................................................................................47 
2. The Firing Rule ˆ ˆ( , )M T ......................................................................47 
3. Problem Definition.............................................................................48 
B. SIMULATION DESCRIPTION...................................................................49 
1. Events Graphs ....................................................................................49 
2. The Simulation Model .......................................................................50 
C. ANALYSIS .....................................................................................................53 
1. Positive Salvo Declaration as a Function of the Firing Rule 
ˆ ˆ( , )M T ..................................................................................................53 
2. False Salvo Declaration as a Function of the Firing Rule 
ˆ ˆ( , )M T ..................................................................................................55 
3. Results of the Base Case Scenario ....................................................57 
4. The Effect of the False Detection Rate.............................................63 
5.  The Effect of the Missile Flight Time..............................................67 
6. The Effect of the Salvos Rate ............................................................68 
7. The Exponential Case ........................................................................71 
V. SUMMARY ................................................................................................................75 
 viii
APPENDIX A.........................................................................................................................77 
LIST OF REFERENCES......................................................................................................79 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST .........................................................................................81 
 
 ix
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1. Probability of success for different missile flight times* ................................14 
Figure 2. Probability of a timely hit for different missile flight times (in seconds) 
and number of residual rockets* ......................................................................15 
Figure 3. Probability of a timely hit for different missile flight times (in seconds) 
and number of residual rockets (increased variability) *.................................18 
Figure 4. Probability of success for different missile flight times (in seconds) 
(increased variability) ......................................................................................19 
Figure 5. Probability of a timely hit or different missile flight times (in seconds) and 
number of residual rockets (Exponential case)  *............................................20 
Figure 6. Probability of success for different missile flight times (in seconds) 
(Exponential case)............................................................................................21 
Figure 7. Probability of success for different missile flight times (in seconds) and 
different M values.* .........................................................................................23 
Figure 8. Probability of success for different missile flight times (in seconds) and 
different M values.* (Perfect detection) ..........................................................25 
Figure 9. Probability of success for different missile flight times (in seconds) and 
different M values.* (Exponential case) ..........................................................26 
Figure 10. Simulation estimates* for the Probability of success for a ground sensor 
guided “smart” missile ( 1)M =  and,  calculated Probability of success for 
the “dumb” missile launched at different number of detections (M) **..........30 
Figure 11. Simulation estimates* for the Probability of success for a ground sensor 
guided “smart” missile launched at different number of detections (M) ** ....33 
Figure 12. Probability of success for a ground sensor guided “smart” missile and, for 
the “dumb” missile launched at different number of detections (M)*  
(Exponential case)............................................................................................35 
Figure 13. Single detection probability of kill for different types of sensors ...................38 
Figure 14. 38 
Figure 15. Probability of rocket detection for different types of sensors..........................39 
Figure 16. Simulation estimates* for the Probability of success as a function of the 
missile flight time (in seconds) for different types of sensors ( 1)M = .**.......40 
Figure 17. Simulation estimates* for the Probability of success as a function of the 
missile flight time (in seconds) for different types of sensors ( 1)M = .** 
(Exponential case)............................................................................................42 
Figure 18. Simulation estimates* for the Probability of success as a function of the 
missile flight time (in seconds) for onboard “Active sensor, for different 
values of M.** (Uniform case) ........................................................................43 
Figure 19. Simulation estimates* for Probability of success as a function of the 
missile flight time (in seconds) for onboard “Passive sensor, for different  
values of M.* (Uniform case) ..........................................................................44 
Figure 20. Simulation estimates* for the Probability of success as a function of the 
missile flight time for onboard “Active sensor, for different  values of 
M.** (Exponential case) ..................................................................................45 
 x
Figure 21. Simulation estimates* for the Probability of success as a function of the 
missile flight time for onboard “Passive sensor, for different  values of 
M.** (Exponential case) ..................................................................................46 
Figure 22. Event graph example........................................................................................49 
Figure 23. Simulation event graph part A .........................................................................51 
Figure 24. Simulation event graph part B .........................................................................52 
Figure 25. Simulation estimates* of the Probability of positive salvo declaration vs. 
Tˆ  (in seconds) for different values of Mˆ ** ...................................................54 
Figure 26. Simulation estimates* of FDP vs. ˆ ˆ( , )M T  **..................................................56 
Figure 27. Simulation estimates* FDR  vs. ˆ ˆ( , )M T **......................................................57 
Figure 28. Simulation estimates* for the Probability of success vs. Tˆ (in seconds) for 
different values of Mˆ (“Dumb” missile)** .....................................................58 
Figure 29. Simulation estimates* of FDR vs. Tˆ (in seconds) for different values of 
Mˆ ** ................................................................................................................59 
Figure 30. Simulation estimates* of FDP vs. Tˆ  (in seconds) for different values of 
Mˆ ** ................................................................................................................60 
Figure 31. Simulation estimates* of the Probability of success for vs. Tˆ (in seconds) 
for different values of Mˆ (“Smart” ground sensor guided missile)**.............61 
Figure 32. Simulation estimates* of Probability of success for vs. Tˆ for different 
values of Mˆ (“Smart” onboard “Passive” sensor guided missile)**...............62 
Figure 33. Simulation estimates* of Probability of positive salvo declaration vs. Tˆ for 
different values of Mˆ . No false detections ** ................................................64 
Figure 34. Simulation estimates* for the Probability of success vs. Tˆ (in seconds) for 
different values of Mˆ (“Dumb” missile).High rate of false detections ** ......65 
Figure 35. Simulation estimates* of FDP vs. Tˆ (in seconds) for different values of 
Mˆ .  High rate of false detections ** ...............................................................66 
Figure 36. Simulation estimates* of Probability of success for vs. Tˆ for different 
values of Mˆ (“Dumb” missile). 2mτ = ** .......................................................68 
Figure 37. Simulation estimates* of the Probability of success for vs. Tˆ (in seconds) 
for different values of Mˆ (“Dumb” missile) High salvo rate** ......................70 
Figure 38. Simulation estimates* of the FDP vs. Tˆ (in seconds) for different values of 
Mˆ High salvo rate **.......................................................................................70 
Figure 39. Simulation estimates* of the Probability of success for vs. Tˆ for different 
values of Mˆ (“Dumb” missile) Exponential case**........................................72 
Figure 40. Simulation estimates* of FDP vs. Tˆ for different values of Mˆ  Exponential 
case **..............................................................................................................73 
Figure 41. Probability of success for different missile flight times ..................................77 
Figure 42. Probability of a timely hit for different missile flight times and number of 
residual rockets* ..............................................................................................78 
 xi
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The Operational Problem  
Terrorists and insurgents are using short range mortars and improvised rockets 
against U.S. and  Israeli Defense Force (IDF) civilians and military targets. The weapons’ 
low signature makes them hard to detect before the actual launch. The mortar tube or the 
rocket launcher are light and easily transported, and may be disposable after the firing. 
This allows the attackers to use a “shoot and scoot” tactic making it hard to detect them 
in time to retaliate effectively. 
The Scenario 
We consider the following situation. An attacker fires a salvo of several rockets at 
a defender. The defender uses a ground sensor to detect the rocket launches. Following a 
certain number of rocket-launch detections, the defender launches a missile aimed at the 
attacker. The attacker stays in position at the launching location until he has fired the last 
rocket in the salvo. Soon after the last rocket of the salvo is fired, the attacker disappears 
from the launching site and becomes invulnerable to the defender’s missile. Since it takes 
some time for the missile to reach its destination, the missile may reach the attacker’s 
launching location after the attacker has escaped, in which case the defender has failed 
his objective to kill the attacker. Therefore the defender has a tradeoff between launching 
his missile earlier but less accurately and, launching it later with more accuracy, but at 
the  risk of being too late.  
The defender’s firing rule determines how many rocket detections need to be 
acquired before launching the missile.  
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 The Model  
The analytic model is described by the following equation: 
1






P missile launched on k rocket P missile hit on time k P is killed k timely hit
=
=
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Where N is the number of rockets in the salvo. In the analytic model we assume that the 
ground sensor has no false positive detections. Later on this assumption is relaxed in a 
simulation implemented in SimKit.  
Current Tactic: “Aim first – Shoot later” 
Typically, to counter rocket, artillery or mortar fire (henceforth called “rockets”), 
a ground sensor (e.g., radar) is assigned to continuously scan a “hot” sector, detect enemy 
rockets, and locate the position of the attacker. To allow the use of high precision 
weapons against the rocket launchers, and in order to reduce collateral damage, the 
defender’s ground sensor attempts to gather as much information as possible about the 
location of the launchers before the defender retaliates. 
The ground sensor tries to track the trajectory of a rocket for as long as possible. 
The estimated trajectories of the rockets are recorded and averaged and, based on these 
averages, the launcher location is estimated. The decision to open counter-fire aimed at 
the launcher may depend on the accuracy of the location estimation. The larger the 
number of rockets observed by the ground sensor, the larger the sample size of the 
estimated trajectories and thus the higher the accuracy of the launcher position. However, 
while this tactic of “wait-and-observe” increases the accuracy of the location estimate, it 
consumes valuable time, during which the attacker may escape and thus render the 
counter-fire useless. A firing rule in this tactic will call for a missile launch after as many 
rocket detections as possible. 
Suggested Tactic: “Shoot first – Aim later” 
To mitigate the possibility that the counter-attack will be executed too late, we 
propose a new tactic. This tactic may require a new type of weapon. 
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Consider a single rocket launcher. Following the first detected rocket in the 
attacker’s salvo, the defender’s ground sensor obtains an initial rough estimate of the 
launcher’s location and immediately launches a precision guided missile (PGM) directed 
towards that estimated location of the attacker’s launcher. While the prompt response will 
save precious time, this is not enough; accuracy is also needed for effective counter-fire. 
The accuracy will be achieved by updating the location estimates of the attacker, while 
the PGM is airborne, based on detection of subsequent rockets in the salvo. This may be 
achieved either by sending information gathered by the ground sensor to the missile via 
uplink or using a second sensor onboard the missile. A firing rule in this tactics will call 
for a missile launch after as few rocket detections as possible. A firing  rule is defined as 
the number of detections recorded in a certain time period. 
Conclusions/Results  
A model for evaluating the effect of various firing rules has been developed and 
the conditions for the suggested tactic success are presented. The suggested tactic has 
been evaluated and explored under several assumptions. The defenders tradeoffs between 
firing rules have been quantified in terms of the probability of killing the attacker, and the 
rate of incidents where false salvos are incorrectly identified, which result in wasted 
missiles and possibly collateral damage. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
Citizens in Israel have been under the threat of short-range rockets and mortar fire 
for more than two decades. Hezbollah, a terror organization based in South Lebanon, has 
used “Katyusha” (107/122 mm) rockets to target towns and cities on Israel’s northern 
border since the 80s.  These attacks have been an ongoing security problem of varying 
intensity over time, from periods of sporadic shootings, to periods of intense 
bombardments lasting days and weeks. 
This form of terror attacks aimed mostly at civilian concentrations reached a peak 
during the Second Lebanon war (July – August 2006). During that one-month period, 
over 4000 rockets were fired towards Israel’s northern region [1].  
Dealing with short and medium range indirect fire (such as Katyusha rockets) has 
always been a great challenge for the Israeli Defense Force (IDF). This type of weapon is 
mounted on a small truck, hauled by mules or even carried by the operator. These 
weapons have very low signature and therefore are very hard to detect before they are 
launched. Furthermore, the rocket operators have adopted a “Shoot and scoot” tactic; 
immediately following the shooting of a few rockets they hurry away from the scene, 
often leaving behind the cheap, disposable launcher (which may be no more than a metal 
tube). Therefore, the response time of the defender must be very short to effectively 
target the rocket operator. 
In recent years U.S. forces are facing similar attacks in Afghanistan and Iraq 
where insurgent forces fire improvised mortar and rockets at both remote military 
outposts and major urban areas (e.g. the “Green zone” in Bagdad) causing both casualties 
and disorder.  
In this thesis, we study the problem of counter-rocket tactics by developing a 
probability model that captures key factors affecting this combat situation. In particular, 
we propose a new tactic and examine it using the probability model.  
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The model developed in this thesis is positioned within the rich research area of 
missile defense. In their book [2] Eckler and Burr discuss a series of models exploring 
offense and defense strategies in allocating ammunition for single and multiple targets. 
Soland [3] explores defense tactics that try to minimize the fraction of a target destroyed 
by the attack when the defender has shoot-look-shoot capability and can execute several 
sequential engagements to intercept the attack. In this thesis we deal with a special case 
of missile defense where first, the defender attacks the launching platform or its operator 
rather than the incoming missiles; and second, the defender has to tradeoff timeliness (i.e. 
the target is time sensitive) with accuracy. We introduce a new tactic (which may call for 
a new weapon as well) that tries to mitigate the defender’s dilemma “wait or shoot” by 
using information about the attacker’s location which becomes available after the 
defender has counter fired.  
Some similarities can be drawn to Ravid [4] where two alternatives of defense 
against attacking aircrafts are compared: early engagement before Bomb-Release-Line 
(BRL) versus engagement with higher kill probability After BRL. Another similar work 
is by Sweat [5] who models a duel scenario where two combatants approach each other. 
The fire of each combatant becomes more accurate as they get closer to each other. Both 
combatants must decide when to shoot. In our case however only the defender has such a 
decision to make where as the attacker’s strategy is predetermined and unaffected by the 
actions of the defender.  
The thesis is organized as follows. In Chapter II we provide the reader with 
background; we describe the current counter rocket tactic and the suggested new tactic; 
and finally we describe the model scenario. In Chapter III, we develop the general 
analytic model and its variation under different assumptions; we present the results and 
discuss the defenders dilemma “wait or launch” under several assumptions. In Chapter 
IV, we explore how false positive detections affect our proposed tactics. For this purpose, 
we develop a simulation.  We present the results and perform sensitivity analysis for 
some of our assumptions. Finally, in Chapter V, we present a summary and conclusions. 
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II. THE COMBAT SITUATION AND ENGAGEMENT TACTICS 
In this chapter, we provide background and introduce the reader to the counter 
rocket/artillery combat situation and the current tactic employed. We discuss the 
disadvantages of the current tactic and suggest a new tactic to mitigate these 
disadvantages. Finally, we describe the scenario we are about to model and introduce our 
Measures of Evaluation (MOEs). 
A. CURRENT COMBAT SITUATION AND TACTICS 
Typically, to counter rocket, artillery or mortar fire (henceforth called “rockets”), 
a ground based sensor (e.g., radar) is assigned to continuously scan a “hot” sector of the 
battlefield, detect enemy rockets, and locate the positions of the hostile rocket launchers. 
To allow the use of high precision weapons against the rocket launchers, and in order to 
reduce collateral damage, the defender’s ground based sensor attempts to gather as much 
information as possible about the location of the launchers before the defender retaliates. 
Specifically, following detection, the ground sensor will try to track the trajectory 
of a rocket for as long as possible until it must stop either because, it is assigned to track a 
new rocket or, because the trajectory of the current rocket is too high to be “seen” by the 
ground sensor. The estimated trajectories of the rockets are recorded and averaged and, 
based on these averages, the launcher location is estimated. The decision to open counter-
fire aimed at the launcher may depend on the accuracy of the location estimation. The 
larger the number of rockets observed by the ground sensor, the larger the sample size of 
the estimated trajectories and thus the higher the accuracy of the launcher position. 
However, while this tactic of “wait-and-observe” increases the accuracy of the location 
estimate, it consumes valuable time during which the operators of the enemy’s launchers 
may escape and thus render the counter-fire useless. This tactical situation, which is 
described in the introduction, represents situations such as countering mobile artillery or 
short range rocket fire by insurgency/terrorist attack. 
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B. SUGGESTED TACTIC AND WEAPON 
To mitigate the possibility that the counter-attack will be executed too late, we 
propose a new tactic, which is described next. This tactic may require a new type of 
weapon. 
Consider a single rocket launcher. Following the first detected rocket in the 
attacker’s salvo, the defender’s ground sensor obtains an initial rough estimate of the 
launcher’s location and immediately launches a precision guided missile (PGM) directed 
towards that estimated location of the attacker’s launcher. While the prompt response will 
save precious time, this is not enough; accuracy is also needed for effective counter-fire. 
The accuracy may be achieved by updating the location estimates of the attacker, while 
the PGM is airborne, based on detection of subsequent rockets in the salvo. There are two 
possible methods to create and utilize these updates: 
1. The ground sensor observes the trajectories of subsequent rockets and 
generates improved updates of the location estimates of the enemy’s 
launcher that are transmitted to the missile. Based on these updated 
estimates the trajectory of the defender’s PGM may be updated in-flight. 
2. The missile is equipped with an EO/IR sensor which can detect the 
launches of subsequent rockets in the salvo while airborne, and based on 
these cues it autonomously updates its trajectory. 
Although the ground sensor may have more energy and resources than a missile 
sensor, it is possible that Method 2 may allow for higher accuracy than achieved by the 
fixed ground sensor in Method 1 because, as the missile approaches the attacker’s 
location, the range gets shorter and thus the location estimates becomes more and more 
accurate. If these in-flight updates, either Method 1 or Method 2, are feasible, they may 
compensate for the disadvantage of launching the missile as early as possible based only 
on a rough estimate of the attacker’s location. 
In this thesis, we study under what technical and operational conditions this tactic 
is superior to the current one where the defender waits and gathers as much information 
as possible about the location of the launchers before launching the PGM. 
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C. SCENARIO 
We consider the following situation. An attacker fires a salvo of several rockets at 
a defender from a mobile, possibly improvised, rocket launcher. The defender uses a 
ground sensor to detect the rocket launches. We assume that the ground sensor may only 
detect the rocket at the moment of launch; it cannot detect a rocket once airborne and it 
does not gather any more information from the rocket’s trajectory. 
Once a rocket launch has been detected by the ground sensor, the defender 
immediately launches a missile aimed at the attacker. We assume that the defender 
launches at most one missile per rocket salvo. The attacker stays in position at the 
launching location until he has fired the last rocket in the salvo. Soon after the last rocket 
of the salvo is fired, the attacker (launch platform or just the operator of the weapon) 
disappears from the launching site and becomes invulnerable to the defender’s missile. 
Since it takes some time for the missile to reach its destination, it is possible for the 
missile to reach the attacker’s launching location after the attacker has escaped, in which 
case the defender has failed his objective to kill the attacker. 
If the missile is launched in such a time that allows the missile to reach the 
attacker’s launching location while the attacker is there, then the attacker may be killed 
with some probability. The (conditional) kill probability of the missile may or may not 
depend on how early it was launched during the salvo. If the missile is “dumb,” meaning 
that it does not have any in-flight guiding mechanism that can improve its accuracy based 
on new information obtained during its flight, then this probability is fixed; more rocket 
detections will have no effect on the accuracy of the missile. If the missile is “smart”, 
meaning that it does have in-flight guiding mechanism, it may use information while 
airborne, gathered either by the ground sensor (Method 1 above) or by an onboard sensor 
(Method 2). In that “smart” case, some of the residual rockets in the salvo may be 
detected, which will update the missile’s trajectory and improve its effectiveness (higher 
probability of kill). 
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In the absence of false positive detections, there is no doubt that the suggested 
tactic will improve the probability of kill for a “smart” missile, which inevitably must be 
more sophisticated and expensive weapon. However, every sensor has some rate of false 
positive detections. Implementing the tactic as suggested above, where the defender fires 
a missile once a rocket has been detected by the sensor, will most likely lead to waste of 
missiles. In an extreme scenario, where the attacker is not firing at all (a cease fire) the 
rate of wasted missiles equals the rate of false detections. Besides the cost of wasted 
munitions, firing needlessly will increase collateral damage. We therefore introduce false 
detections to the model in Chapter 4 and accordingly suggest a missile launch decision 
mechanism to reduce the rate of unwanted missile launches. 
Our major measures of effectiveness in this thesis are therefore, the unconditional 
probability of killing the attacker, sucesssP ; and the probability of a false salvo declaration 
(and missile launch) or rate of false salvo declarations. 
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III. THE ANALYTIC MODEL - NO FALSE POSITIVES 
DETECTIONS 
In this chapter, our main assumption is that the ground sensor has no false 
positive detections. This simplifying assumption allows us to use analytic tools and 
explore our MOEs through their explicit expressions.  
Notation Definitions and General Assumptions 
We make the following assumptions and notation: 
• The ground sensor has no false positive detections (we shall relax this 
assumption in chapter 4). 
• Number of rockets N in a salvo is fixed.  
• The number of residual rockets in the salvo after the kth rocket is N-k. 
• The inter-firing times fT between rockets in a salvo, are iid with cdf 
( )fF t  and pdf ( )ff t . 
• The escape time eT is the time that passes from the firing of the last rocket 
till the moment the attacker disappears. This time is independent of fT  
and has cdf ( )eG t  and pdf ( )eg t . 
• The missile flight time mτ  is fixed. 
• All detections occur at the time of the rockets’ launches. 
•  The ground sensor detects a launch with probability α independently from 
rocket to rocket. 
• The defender launches a missile immediately following the first detected 
rocket launch. 
• No more than one missile is launched per salvo. 
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• A timely hit occurs when the missile reaches its destination before the 
attacker has escaped. 
• The missile probability of kill, given the target is present at time of impact 
is killP  (and zero otherwise). 
A. GROUND SENSOR AND “DUMB” MISSILE 
1. Assumption 
In this subsection, we explore the model where the defender’s missile is “dumb”, 
meaning that once the missile has been launched it can neither gather nor receive from 
the ground sensor any more information about its target location. Therefore it cannot 
adjust its trajectory while airborne, and thus cannot enhance its accuracy. In our model 
this assumption is implicit in the fact that killP  is fixed regardless of the number of residual 
rockets. 
2. Deriving the Model Equation 
We wish to compute successP - the probability that the attacker has been killed. 
We first look at the distribution of the random variable N kT −  – the time left from 
the detection of the kth rocket till the attacker has escaped.  
Since N kT −  is the sum of N-k+1 random variables: N-k rocket inter-firing times 
and the escape time, the probability density function of N kT −  denoted ( )N k N kh t− − is the 
convolution of (N-k+1) density functions, N-k density functions of fT , the inter-firing 
times, and one density function of eT , the escape time. 
We get: 
 ( ) (( ) )( )N k N k N k
N k times
h t f f g t− − −
−  
= ∗⋅⋅⋅∗ ∗14243  (0.1) 
By integrating we may find the corresponding cumulative distribution function 
 ( ) { }N k N k N k N kH t P T t− − − −= ≤  
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3. Deriving ( )N k N kH t− −  
To facilitate carrying out the convolutions in the following derivation I will use 
the Laplace transform and its following properties. 
• Given a non negative function ( )f x , its Laplace transform is defined as: 
 
0
( ) ( ) ( )s xs L f e f x dxϕ
∞
− ⋅= = ∫  (0.3) 
• The Laplace transform of a convolution of two functions is the 
multiplication of their Laplace transforms: 
 ( ) ( ) ( )L f g L f L g∗ = ⋅  (0.4) 
 1{ ( ) ( )}f g L L f L g−∗ = ⋅  (0.5) 
• The Laplace transform of the integration operator: 
 1
0
1{ ( )} ( ') '
t
L L f f t dt
s
− = ∫  (0.6) 
• The Laplace transform of an exponential factor: 
 1{ ( ) ( )} ( )tL L f s e f tαα− −⋅ − =  (0.7) 
• The Laplace transform of a time shift: 
 1{ ( ) } ( ) ( )tL L f e f t U tα α α− −⋅ = − ⋅ −  (0.8) 
Where ( )U t is the unit step function. 
3.1 First Case - Uniform Distributions 
In this case we assume both the inter-firing times and the escape time have 
Uniform distributions. 
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We denote the mean inter-firing time as fμ  and the mean time to escape as eμ . 
The density functions and their respective Laplace transforms are then given by: 
 

















ϕ − − − + − − −
⎧     ≤ − ≤⎪= ⎨⎪                 ο.ω.⎩
= = − = −
 (0.9) 
 

















ϕ − − − + − − −
⎧     ≤ − ≤⎪= ⎨⎪                 ο.ω.⎩
= = − = −
 (0.10) 
Substituting (0.9) and (0.10) into (0.1) and using the relationship in (0.4) we get: 
 
( )
( ) ( )2 ) ( ) 2 )
( ) ( ) ( )




N k f g
a s b sas N k bs
L h s s




− − − −− − −
= ⋅ =
− ⋅ −  (0.11) 
We expand the expression using Newton’s binomial formula: 
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( ) ( )








a N k s
N k N k N k
N k















Rearranging we get: 
 
( ) ( 1)




( 1) [ ]f e f e
N k N k N k
N k







μ μ μ μ
− − − +
− − − − + + − − − − + + +
=
⎧ ⎫ ⎧ ⎫= ⋅ ⋅⎨ ⎬ ⎨ ⎬⋅ ⎩ ⎭⎩ ⎭
⎧ ⎫−⎛ ⎞− ⋅ −⎨ ⎬⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎩ ⎭∑
 (0.13) 
We notice that (0.13) is composed of three parts (separated by parentheses), the 
first part is some constant independent of s, the second part is ( 1)
1
N ks − +
 , and the third part 
is a sum of exponents dependent on s. 












− + = −   
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Recalling from relationship (0.8) that exponents in the s domain are translations in 
the time domain we get the final result: 
( )




1( 1) [( ) ( ) ( ) ( )]
( )!
N k N k
N k





t U t t U t
m N k
β β β β
− −
− − −
− − + +
=
= ⋅




( )( ) 2 ( )





a N k am b





= − − + + −
= − − + + +  
We can very easily carry out the integration and get: 
( )




1( 1) [( ) ( ) ( ) ( )]
( 1)!
N k N k
N k





t U t t U t
m N k
β β β β
− −
− − + − +
− − + +
=
= ⋅
−⎛ ⎞− ⋅ ⋅ − ⋅ − − − ⋅ −⎜ ⎟ − +⎝ ⎠∑
(0.15) 
 
3.2 Second Case – Normal Distributions 
In this case we assume both the inter-firing times and the escape time have normal 
distributions. We denote the mean inter-firing time as fμ  with variance 2fσ  and the mean 
time to escape as eμ with variance 2eσ . In this case N kT −  has a normal distribution with 
mean ( )N k f eN kμ μ μ− = − ⋅ +  and variance 2 2 2( )N k f eN kσ σ σ− = − ⋅ + . 
We note that a Normal random variable may assume negative values which are 
not appropriate in the case of time. However, it can be easily shown that for the scenario 
explored in this paper, the negative tail of the normal distribution is insignificant and 
truncating it will not have significant effect on the results.  
3.3 Third Case - Exponential Distributions 
In this case, we assume both the inter-firing times and the escape time have 
exponential distributions. 
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We denote the mean inter-firing time as 1
fλ and the mean time to escape as 1 eλ . 
The density functions and their respective Laplace transforms are then given by: 
 ( ) f tf ff t e




λϕ λ= = +  (0.16) 
 ( ) ete eg t e




λϕ λ= = +  (0.17) 




( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
N k
fN k e
N k f g N k
f e
L h s s
s s
λ λϕ ϕ λ λ
−
−
− −= ⋅ = ⋅+ +  (0.18) 
We define:  ' es sλ= +  and substitute into 11) 
 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( )1 1( )
( ') ' ( ) ' ( ')
1 ( ')
( ') ' ( ' ')
N k N k N k
f e f e f e
N k N k N k N k
f e f e f e
N k N k
f e
N k N k
L h
s s s s
s s
λ λ λ λ λ λ




− − − −
− −
− −
⋅ ⋅ −= ⋅ = ⋅ ⋅ =− + − − +
⎧ ⎫⋅ ⎧ ⎫⎪ ⎪ ⎧ ⎫⋅ ⋅⎨ ⎬ ⎨ ⎬ ⎨ ⎬+⎩ ⎭⎪ ⎪ ⎩ ⎭⎩ ⎭
 (0.19) 
We notice that (0.19) is the multiplication of three expressions (separated by 
parentheses), the first one being independent of s’, the second one is just the inverse of s’ 
and the third we recognize to be the Laplace transform of the Erlang density function 
with parameters N-k, and ' f eλ λ λ= − . 







( ) [1 ]
( ) !
f ee
N k mN k
tf e f et
N k N k
mf e
t
h t e e
m
λ λλ λ λ λ λ
λ λ
− − − − −−
− −
=
⋅ −= −− ∑  (0.20) 
The exponent at the beginning of (0.20) is the result of the substitution we made 
in (0.18) and the relationship in (0.7). 
4. Analysis 
Now that we have an expression for ( )N k N kH t− − we can calculate the probability 
for a timely hit and therefore – by factor multiplication – the probability of killing the 
attacker. 
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We would like to explore how sucssesP  is affected by variations in the technological 
(e.g. missile speed, ground sensor’s probability of rocket detection, missile lethality) and 
operational (e.g. defender attacker distance, rockets rate of fire) parameters.  
Recall the expression for sucssesP . 
1
1
(1 ) { }
N
k
sucsses N k m kill
k
P P T Pα α τ− −
=
= − ⋅ ⋅ ≥ ⋅∑   (3.2) 
Next we analyze the problem with respect to the three aforementioned cases:, 
Uniform, Normal and Exponential distributions. In all three cases we make the same 
assumptions as described in the introduction to Chapter 3 and in section 3.A.1.We 
analyze the effect of missile flying time on the probability of success. Recall that for the 
“dumb” missile sucssesP  is proportional to killP  therefore we can focus only on the 
probability of a timely hit. 
We first substitute our results for ( )N k N kH t− −  composed of uniform distributions 
from subsection A.3.1. 
Uniform Distributions 
The scenario:  
There are N = 5 rockets in the salvo. The attacker is using some kind of short 
range mortar similar to the U.S. Army’s M224. The inter-firing time is uniformly 
distributed between 4.5 to 5.5 seconds (reasonable for this kind of weapon see [6]). The 
attacker is well prepared for escape prior to firing the salvo and therefore the time to 




Figure 1. Probability of success for different missile flight times* 
* Flight times are in seconds 
Figure 1presents the probability of success for different missile flight times. We 
see that the probability of success is a monotone non-increasing function of the missile 
flight time. This comes as no great surprise since we know the longer it takes the missile 
to reach the target the higher the chances are that the target will escape before the missile 
hits the ground. 
We notice that the decrease is occurring in 5 steps. The last drop to zero occurs 
when the missile flight time is about 35 seconds. 
We note that the average time the enemy is in position after the first rocket is fired 
is given by: ( 1) 35f eN μ μ− ⋅ + =  seconds. 
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To understand the behavior of the probability of success as shown in the curve of 
Figure 1, let’s explore the probability for a timely hit when there are N-k residual rockets, 
given by { } 1 ( )N k m N k mP T Hτ τ− −≥ = − . 
The following Figure presents { }N k mP T τ− ≥ for different numbers of residual 
rockets N-k, and missile flight time mτ . The scenario parameters are as in Figure 1 
 
Figure 2. Probability of a timely hit for different missile flight times (in seconds) and 
number of residual rockets* 
* To properly read this figure, print in color. 
We notice that the probability of a timely hit given the number of rockets left in 
the salvo is a sharp step function, in particular for a small number of residual rockets. The 
drop moves in the positive direction of the mτ axis for increasing number of residual 
rockets. 
0 Rockets left 
4 Rockets left 
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This makes sense because each rocket left in the salvo increases the average time 
till the target escapes and allows more time for the missile to reach its target. We see that 
each one of the curves is indeed shifted by about 5 seconds which corresponds to the 
mean inter-firing time of the rockets. 
We go back now to analyze the behavior of the probability of success in Figure 
1Recall from Equation (0.2) that the probability of success is expressed by a sum of 
arguments, each one containing the probability for a timely hit given a different number 
of residual rockets. Consider now the region in Figure 1 for values greater than 35 
seconds. Looking in the corresponding region in Figure 2 we see that the probability for a 
timely hit is zero for any possible number of residual rockets (0 to N-1) in this scenario. 
When the missile flight time is very long, even detection of the very first rocket (leaving 
4 more rockets in the salvo) does not leave enough time for the missile to reach the target 
in time. 
Now consider the region where mτ  is between about 30 and 35 seconds. 
According to our scenario the average time between the first rocket launch in the salvo 
and the moment the attacker escapes is 35 seconds. On average there are 30 seconds 
between the second rocket launch in the salvo and the moment the attacker escapes, and 
so on.  Notice in Figure 2 that for this [30,35] region of mτ  the probability for a timely hit 
is non zero if there are 4 rockets left in the salvo, and zero or close to zero if there are less 
than 4 rockets left in the salvo, meaning that the first rocket must be detected in order to 
have a significant probability of timely hit. In Figure 1, we see a step up in the probability 
of success when 35mτ < seconds. If we decrease the missile flight time further we enter a 
region in Figure 2 where the probability of timely hit is significantly greater than zero if 
the number of rockets left in the salvo is at least 3. This means that in the expression for 
the probability of success (0.2) two of the arguments in the sum are now non-zero. This is 
why we see another step up in the probability of success as we decrease .mτ  
As discussed above, the probability of success decreases in steps when increasing 
the missile flight time. However, we notice that the size of each step is not the same; the 
last decrement (when mτ  increases above 35 sec) being the largest.  
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To understand why this happens we go back to the expression of the probability 
of success in Eq.(0.2).  We notice that the arguments of the sum are multiplied by a 
discrete function of k, 1( ) (1 )k killd k Pα α−= − ⋅ ⋅ . Since α is between 0 and 1 ( )d k  is 
monotone increasing with the number of residual rockets. ( )d k  controls the step size of 
the curve in Figure 1(probability of success), we can now see why the returns for 
decreasing the missile flight time are diminishing. 
The initial increase in the probability of success (when the missile flight time is 
just small enough to give some chance of success), is given by ( )d k  for the case when 
k=1, which gives: (1) killd Pα= ⋅ . So, if reducing the missile flight time is difficult, and we 
want to maximize the initial jump in the probability of success, we should increase α as 
much as possible.  
At the heart of this qualitative behavior of step decreases in the probability of 
success seen in Figure 1, is the fact that we chose time parameters (inter-firing and 
escape) with relatively small variances. These small variances lead to uniform cdf close 
to a step function. The uniform cumulative distribution becomes close to a step function 
whenever we reduce the range between its two parameters relative to their midpoint 
(mean). This occurs because the pdf will become close to an impulse function and thus 
the cdf will become close to a step function. This in turn makes the 
distribution ( )N k N kH t− −  resemble a step function. 
When we increase the range of the distribution, we increase the variance relative 
to the mean of the underlying distributions and we get less steep CDFs. This will change 
the discrete jump nature of the curve we see in Figure 1 and make the probability of 
success plot ”smoother”. 
Figure 3presents the probability of a timely hit for the uniform distribution case 
with greater variability.  Figure 4presents the resulting probability of successes. 
The scenario is:  
There are N = 5 rockets in the salvo as before. The attacker uses the same weapon 
however he fires at a less regular rate and the inter-firing time is uniformly distributed 
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between 4 to 6 seconds. The time to escape is uniformly distributed between 10 to 20 
seconds. Notice that the means of the underlying distributions are still 5 and 15 seconds, 
respectively, as before. 0.7; 1killPα = =  
 
 
Figure 3. Probability of a timely hit for different missile flight times (in seconds) and 
number of residual rockets (increased variability) * 
* To properly read this figure, print in color.  
0 Rockets left 




Figure 4. Probability of success for different missile flight times (in seconds) 
(increased variability) 
Exploring the case of normal distributions gives similar results to the uniform 
case. Therefore we move directly to the exponential case. Results for the normal case are 
presented in appendix A.  
Exponential Distributions 
An interesting case is the case where both the escape time and the inter-firing 
times are exponential random variables. In this case, the mean and the variance are 
coupled and the ratio between the mean and the standard deviation is always 1. Therefore 
we never achieve the qualitative behavior of step decreases and always get a smooth 
curve as in the high variability case above. There is still some effect of diminishing 
returns, however; it seems the “knee” of the curve is only achieved for a relatively low 
missile flight time. Another interesting observation is that for the exponential case the 
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probability of successes is quite high even for very high values of missile flight time. 
This is again due to the high variability imposed by the exponential distribution because 
the variance is the square of the mean. 
Figure 5and 0present the exponential case. The mean times are the same as in 
Figure 3and Figure 4 
 
Figure 5. Probability of a timely hit or different missile flight times (in seconds) and 
number of residual rockets (Exponential case)  * 
* To properly read this figure, print in color.  
0 Rockets left 




Figure 6. Probability of success for different missile flight times (in seconds) 
(Exponential case) 
5. Tradeoff: Wait or Launch? 
Recall that the probability of success depends on two factors: timely hit and 
accuracy. So far we assumed perfect accuracy and only looked at the defender’s attempt 
to respond as quickly as possible and so increase the probability of timely hit. However, 
in reality accuracy is not perfect and by waiting and sampling more rockets in the salvo 
the defender may improve his accuracy at the cost of reducing the probability of timely 
hit. So the question is wait and improve accuracy while reducing the probability of timely 
hit, or launch with lower accuracy but higher probability of timely hit. 
Let us now assume that the defender launches the missile after M detections. The 
missile will be aimed at the average of the M location estimates. The serial number k of 
the rocket after which the missile is launched has a negative binomial distribution with 
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parameters M and α. We further assume that the defender’s missile has a cookie cutter 
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 (0.21)  
and that the defender’s errors of the estimates of attacker’s location after each rocket 
detection are iid circular normal random variables with mean 0μ =  and variance 2σ . The 
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We rewrite Eq. (0.2) as follows: 
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0 presents the probability of success for different missile flight times and different 
M values. The scenario is the same as in Figure 1; that is, uniform inter-firing and escape 




Figure 7. Probability of success for different missile flight times (in seconds) and 
different M values.* 
* To properly read this figure, print in color.  
We see that if the defender chooses to shoot as early as possible immediately after 
the first detection (M = 1) then even a slow flying missile, which takes as long as 35 
seconds to reach the attacker, may still hit the attacker with probability of ~0.15. For 
1M >  this probability is 0. However in this case the maximum probability of success is 
about 0.4 for different defender missile flight times. On the other hand, waiting for the 
second detection does not allow the defender to use a missile which takes longer than 
about 32 seconds to reach the target; however the maximum probability of success is 








We see that there is a tradeoff between the defender waiting to launch until more 
than one rocket has been detected and thus improving the probability of kill vs. the 
defender launching the missile as early as possible and saving valuable time. Waiting too 
long (M=5) is not beneficial because the loss of valuable time overrides the gain in 
accuracy and the net result is a low probability of success. The dashed black line marks 
the maximal value over all 5 curves. We see that if the defender has a very fast missile 
( 15mτ ≤  sec), the defender should wait for 3 detections before launching the missile. 
However if the defender has a missile which takes more than about 15 seconds to reach 
the target but less than 25 seconds,  he should wait for only 2 detections, and if the 
missile takes longer than about 25 seconds the defender should launch his missile 
immediately after the first detection. 
There is another element influencing the probability of success beside the 
probability of timely hit and accuracy. This other element is the probability of missile 
launch. Notice that in our formulation for every value of M there is some chance that no 
more than M-1 rockets will be detected, in which case the missile is not launched at all. 
Consider the region in 0where 0mτ = . Obviously a timely hit is guaranteed in this case. 
One might expect the curves to be ordered such that the most “accurate” missile ( 5)M =  
will be on top, and the least “accurate” missile ( 1)M =  at the bottom. However we see 
that the curve with the lowest probability of success is the one where 5M = and the 
missile is the most accurate. We get this result because the event 5 out of 5 rockets 
detected is less likely than for instance than the event 1 out of 5 rockets detected. Figure 8 
presents the case where the probability of rocket detection is 1. The rest of the scenario is 
just as in 0 Notice when 0mτ =  the curves are ordered by M from top to bottom. We 
notice that in this case the defender’s best policy changes, and for low values of mτ  the 




Figure 8. Probability of success for different missile flight times (in seconds) and 
different M values.* (Perfect detection) 
* To properly read this figure, print in color. 
0 presents the probability of success for different missile flight times and different 
M values for the exponential case, that is exponential inter-firing and escape distributions. 
The mean inter-firing time and escape time are 5 and 15 seconds respectively. We 








Figure 9. Probability of success for different missile flight times (in seconds) and 
different M values.* (Exponential case) 
* To properly read this figure, print in color.  
Just as in Figure 6, we note that the curves in the exponential case are smoother 
and with a longer “tail” than in the uniform case. This is due to the greater variability in 
the exponential case and to the pdf’s shape. Comparing 0 with 0 , we find great similarity 
between the two figures. We find the same curves intersect with each other in both 
figures (for instance 1M =  intersect 2,3& 4M = in both figures), a lower M allows the 
defender to use a slower missile and so on. In both cases we see that given a very fast 
missile the best policy of the defender is to launch after 3M =  detected rockets; for a 
slower missile the defender should launch after 2M =  detected rockets; and for a very 
slow missile the defender should launch at 1M =  . However, in the exponential case the 
region of mτ where 2M = is the best policy extends from ~ 5mτ  to ~ 40mτ . Even 







probability of success between 1M = and 2M = seems insignificant. It would seem then 
that in the exponential case, if there is some ambiguity regarding mτ  the defender’s “best 
bet” would be to launch after 2M = detected rockets. 
B. GROUND SENSOR AND “SMART” MISSILE 
1. Assumptions 
So far, we have assumed that once the missile has been launched it cannot get any 
more information about the location of the target. In our model this assumption was 
implicit in the fact that killP  was fixed regardless of the number of residual rockets or the 
value of mτ . 
We now assume that the defender has a “smart” missile, meaning that the missile 
has an in-flight guiding mechanism. The “smart” missile may use new information 
gathered while it is airborne. This new information may be gathered either by the ground 
sensor or by an onboard sensor. With this capability, some of the residual rockets in the 
salvo may be detected and be used to improve the estimation of the target location. The 
improved estimate may enhance the accuracy of the missile and result in higher value 
of killP . 
Recall that for the “dumb” missile killP  is fixed regardless of the number of 
rockets that are launched during the missile’s flight. The question now is what will be the 
behavior of killP for the “smart” missile. 
First, we notice that killP for the “smart” missile is not smaller than killP  for the 
“dumb” missile. This is true because the “dumb” missile may be considered as a special 
case of the “smart” missile. In this special case no new information is gathered (i.e. the 
sensor providing the new in-flight information is very poor). 
Second, we note that killP  must be monotone non-decreasing in the number of 
residual rockets. The larger the number of residual rockets, the more opportunities there 
are to obtain additional observations for estimating the target location and thus improve 
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the trajectory of the defender’s missile and enhance its accuracy and effectiveness. We 
therefore conclude that ( )killP N k− is a monotone non-decreasing function of N-k, the 
number of residual rockets. 
Finally, we note that killP  must also be a monotone non-decreasing function of mτ . 
Information gathered after the missile has reached its target is lost and cannot change the 
missile’s trajectory. Therefore only rockets launched during the missile’s flight can help 
improve its effectiveness. The longer mτ  the more opportunities there are for detecting 
residual rockets.  
To capture the full picture we should consider the probability of kill to be a 
function of both the number of residual rockets and of the missile flight time. However 
finding an analytically tractable closed form expression for ( , )kill mP N k τ− is difficult (in 
most cases); we therefore adopt a different approach, using a simulation, to explore our 
model. The simulation is described in detail in Chapter IV.  
2. Ground Sensor Guided “Smart” Missile (Method 1) 
We first explore the case where the “smart” missile receives new information 
gathered by the ground sensor. Following the same arguments as in section 3.A.5 we find 
an expression for the probability of kill similar to the one in Eq. (0.22). However, now we 
consider not only the number of rockets detected prior to the defender’s missile launch 
but also the  number L of rockets detected out of V rockets fired while the missile was 
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Finding a general expression for { | , }mP V v N k τ= − when the underlying 
distribution are Uniform, is quite difficult and so we will use the simulation as mentioned 
above.  
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Let us look first at the case of the smart missile launched after 1M =  detected 
rocket. Figure 10presents the estimated probability of success for a ground sensor guided 
“smart” missile, launched after 1M =  detected rocket. Each estimate is from a single 
simulation run containing a sequence of 1000 rocket salvos. The results for the “dumb” 
missile we have presented in section 3.A.5 are also presented here. The scenario is the 
same as in Figure 1 (Uniform interfering and escape distributions). We assume 




Figure 10. Simulation estimates* for the Probability of success for a ground sensor 
guided “smart” missile ( 1)M =  and,  calculated Probability of success for the 
“dumb” missile launched at different number of detections (M) ** 
* Each estimate is from a single simulation run containing a sequence of 1000 
rocket salvos. 
**To properly read this figure, print in color.  
We see that the probability of success is no longer a monotone decreasing 
function in the missile flight time. Instead, it has a mode, starting at a relatively low level, 
increasing to a maximal probability of about 0.8 and then dropping to zero. 
We recall that in this scenario, the missile has to be in flight to receive any new 
information after it has been launched, this accounts for the initial increase in the 
probability of success we see in the figure above. As mτ  increases there is a higher 





observations increase killP and finally the probability of success. As the missile flight time 
increases, eventually the probability of a timely hit decreases; this in turn decreases the 
probability of success and eventually reduces it to zero. 
Notice that the “smart” missile with 1M =  is always superior to the “dumb” 
missile with 1M = . This is because it will always have at least as much information as 
the “dumb” missile when launched immediately after the first detection. The probability 
of success for the “smart” missile when 1M =  drops to zero alongside the probability of 
success for the “dumb” missile when 1M = . When 1M =  the “smart” missile is 
launched as early as possible; its chances for a timely hit are just as good as those of the 
“dumb” missile fired immediately after the first detection. For values of mτ  lower than 
about 5, the probability of success using the “smart” missile with 1M =  is the same as 
that for the “dumb” missile with 1M = . This makes sense because when mτ is very small, 
there is very little chance for another rocket to be detected during the “smart” missile’s 
flight. The “smart” missile will then be aimed only based on the single rocket detected by 
the ground sensor prior to the missile launch, the same as in the “dumb” missile case with 
1M = .  
Recall that the maximum of the probability of success for the “dumb” missile 
over all values of M ( max( )successM P ), provides us with the best course of action the 
defender can take using the “dumb” missile.  Comparing successP for the “smart” missile 
with 1M =  to max( )successM P  for the “dumb” missile, we see that for high values of mτ the 
“smart” missile with 1M =  is more effective than the “dumb” missile, regardless the 
value of M. However below a certain value (about 10 sec) of mτ it becomes better to use a 
“dumb” missile launched after 3M =  detected rockets, than using the “smart” missile 
with 1M = . In this case the missile is effectively so fast that there is no need to rush and 
launch it early. It is almost guaranteed that a very fast missile will reach its target in time. 
However it is less likely that during its short flight more rockets will be launched and 
detected. 
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Notice that the peak of the probability of success for the “smart” missile is higher 
than max( )successM P  for the “dumb” missile. This is because when the defender uses the 
“dumb” missile, his best course of action utilizes the information from at most 3 rockets 
(he may choose to use the information of more rockets, but the advantage of more 
information is lost to the disadvantage of launching too late); however the “smart” 
missile is launched as early as possible, and if it is in the air long enough it may use the 
information of possibly up to N rockets. 
We see that firing the “smart” missile after 1M =  detected rocket is not always 
better than the “dumb” missile. It is interesting to see what happens if the defender uses 
the “smart” ground sensor guided missile and waits to launch it after more than 
1M = detected rockets. Each estimate is from a single simulation run containing a 
sequence of 1000 rocket salvos. The following figure presents the simulation results for 
the probability of success for a ground sensor guided “smart” missile, for different values 
of M. Also presented is the curve of the best course of action the defender can take using 
the “dumb” missile we have seen in Figure 7 The scenario is the same as in Figure 1 
(Uniform inter-firing and escape distributions). We assume 2 1.p R σ= = =  
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Figure 11. Simulation estimates* for the Probability of success for a ground sensor 
guided “smart” missile launched at different number of detections (M) ** 
* Each estimate is from a single simulation run containing a sequence of 1000 
rocket salvos. 
**To properly read this figure, print in color.  
Comparing Figure 7and Figure 11We see that for any given value of M the 
“smart” missile is superior to the “dumb” missile. However as M gets higher the 
difference between using the “smart” vs. the “dumb” missile diminishes. This is because 
the “smart” missile improves on the “dumb” missile by taking advantage of the 
opportunities to detect residual rockets while it’s airborne. As M increases there are fewer 
such opportunities.  In fact there is no difference between the “smart” and the “dumb” 
missile when 5M =  since there are no residual rockets for the “smart” missile to draw 
on. The dash-dot black line marks the maximal value over all 5 curves (for the “smart” 
missile). This line provides us with the defender best policy using the smart missile. We 
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see just as with the dumb missile the faster the missile the longer the defender is willing 
to wait (higher M). The defender should never wait for more than 3M = detected rockets.  
There is no advantage in using the smart missile when mτ  is very small because there is 
little chance of detecting an additional rocket launch while the missile is airborne. 
We notice that in the Uniform distributions case, just as in section 3.A.5 that the 
increase and decrease in the probability of success occur in steps due to the low 
variability of the distributions we chose. 
When the underlying distributions are exponential, it is easier to find an explicit 
expression for equation (0.25). When the inter-firing times are Exponential iid random 
variables and given k we can say that, min( , )V N k X= −   where ~ ( )f mX Poisson λ τ . 
Furthermore min( , )L N k Y= −  where ~ ( )f mY Poisson α λ τ⋅  is a Poisson distribution. 
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Figure 12 presents the probability of success for a ground sensor guided “smart” 
missile, alongside the results for the “dumb” missile we have presented in section 3.A.5. 
The scenario is Exponential inter-firing and escape distributions with means 5 and 15 




Figure 12. Probability of success for a ground sensor guided “smart” missile and, for the 
“dumb” missile launched at different number of detections (M)* 
 (Exponential case) 
* To properly read this figure, print in color.  
We find great similarity between Figure 11and Figure 12The ground sensor 
guided missile is always superior to the “dumb” missile launched at a given number M of 
detected rockets. For higher values of M the “smart” missile loses its advantage over the 
“dumb” missile. However, note that the peak probability of success for the “smart” 
missile has shifted from to lower values of mτ . For instance for 1M = , the peak 
probability of success has moved from ~ 23mτ secs (for the Uniform case) to ~ 15mτ secs 
(for the Exponential case). The peak itself is lower for the Exponential case (about 0.62) 
then for the Uniform case (about 0.8). Because the inter-firing time in the Exponential 
case has greater variability, it may assume higher values than in the uniform case. This 
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reduces the probability of detecting residual rocket fired while the missile is airborne. 
The probability of timely hit is lower in the Exponential case than in the Uniform case 
(see Figure 2and Figure 5).  The net result is a lower peak probability of success than in 
the Uniform case.   
3. Onboard Sensor “Smart” Missile (Method 2) 
We now explore the case where the “smart” missile receives new information 
gathered by an onboard sensor.  
The onboard sensor presents us with a new situation. We now have to take into 
account the improvement in both the probability of rocket detection and the probability of 
kill as the sensor moves toward the attacker’s location; the shorter the distance between 
the sensor and the launching site, the higher the detection probability and the accuracy of 
the target location estimate. We assume that the onboard sensor is able to detect and 
measure the attacker’s location at any range and it is not limited by its footprint or 
orientation.   
It is well known (see [8],[9]) that both parameters – detection probability and 
accuracy of location estimate – are related to the signal to noise ratio or the energy 
reaching the sensor from its target. We denote this energy as E. 
We take the general relationship between the probability of detection and E from 








⋅= + ⋅  (0.27) 
Where 1C  is some normalization-factor, and ( )dP E  is the probability of rocket 
detection when the sensor receives energy E from the launching site.  
Let us assume that the errors of location estimation are iid circular normal random 
variables with mean zero and variance 2 ( )Eσ . In [9] it is shown that the variance is 
related to E as follows: 
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 2 2( ) CE
E
σ =  (0.28) 
Where 2C is some normalization-factor. We assume that the sensor will use a 
simple average to integrate the information from several rocket detections.  
If at the time of impact the sensor has detected S rockets, each with energy 
1...iE i S = then the variance of the averaged location estimation will be given by: 
2 2
2




σ σ= ∑ . We have already found the relationship between the probability of 
kill and the variance of the averaged measurements in (0.22). Substituting 2sσ  and (0.28)
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Finally we note that E is some function of D the distance between the sensor and 
the target. The relationship 4
1( )E D
D
   may be appropriate for an active sensor (e.g. A 




   (e.g. Electro-optical sensor which suffers one way attenuation 
losses) The relationship 1( )E D
D
   may represent some other kind of sensor. 
Equipped with these expressions we can now use our simulation to explore the 
case of an onboard sensor. Figure 13 and Figure 13Figure 15present the single detection 
probability of kill (based only on the information from one rocket detection from that 
sensor) and the probability of detection for different types of sensors as a function of their 
distance from the target. The distance is normalized such that 1D =  is the distance 
between the ground sensor and the target. We assume that the onboard sensor is much 
smaller than the ground sensor (due to limited space on the missile) and therefore is 
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Ε=  =  
. This is why at same distance from the target the ground sensor is more effective than the 
onboard sensor. The normalization-factors 1C  and 2C  in equations (0.27) and (0.29) 
respectively are chosen such that: 2 ( ) 1ground sensorσ  Ε =  and ( ) 0.7d ground sensorP  Ε = ;  We 
assume 1p R = = . 
 
Figure 13. Single detection probability of kill for different types of sensors  
Figure 14.  
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Figure 15. Probability of rocket detection for different types of sensors 
 40
 
Figure 16 presents the probability of success as a function of the missile flight 
time for different types of onboard sensors when 1M = . The case of the ground sensor 
guided missile when 1M =  is presented for reference.  The scenario is as in Figure 
1(Uniform inter-firing and escape distributions). We assume 2 ( ) 1.ground sensorp R Eσ  = = =  
 
Figure 16.  Simulation estimates* for the Probability of success as a function of the 
missile flight time (in seconds) for different types of sensors ( 1)M = .** 
* Each estimate is from a single simulation run containing a sequence of 1000 
rocket salvos. 
** To properly read this figure, print in color.  
We notice that for high values of mτ  all types of onboard sensors give lower 
probability of success than the ground sensor. This is because large mτ implies that the 
missile is slow; therefore when the residual rockets are launched the onboard sensor is 
“Other” Active 
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more likely to be relatively far away from its destination. Because the sensor is far away 
from the target the overall information it provides (as determined by the number of 
residual rockets detected and the measurement errors they have) is less than the 
information that the ground sensor would have provided. However as mτ  becomes 
smaller (and the missile is faster), we see that the probability of success for the onboard 
sensor increases (although not in a monotone fashion) until it goes above the probability 
of success for the ground sensor guided missile. Finally, as in the case of the ground 
sensor guided missile, when mτ  is small enough the missile is so fast that no rockets are 
launched or detected during the missile’s flight; the resulting probability of success has 
the same value as if the missile was “dumb”.  
We note that the probability of success now has more than one mode. For instance 
for all onboard sensors, there is a gradual decrease in the probability of success 
when5 10mτ≤ ≤ , then around 10mτ = there is a sharp increase in the probability of 
success. As we increase mτ  from 5 to 10, the missile becomes slower; the rockets 
launched during its flight are detected further away from the missile. For this reason the 
rockets become harder for the onboard sensor to detect and when detected they provide 
less information and have a less effect on the probability of kill. However since the inter-
firing time is uniform between 4.5 and 5.5 seconds, during a flight time of less than 10 
seconds no more than 2 rockets may be launched and detected. As we increase mτ beyond 
10 seconds, the opportunity to detect a third rocket arises; the extra rocket will provide 
more information which causes a spike in the probability of success. This ripple effect 
would not have been so distinct had we chosen inter-firing times with a greater range.  
For the scenario described above, we see it is not beneficial to use an on-board 
sensor, unless we have a relatively fast missile. 
Figure 17 presents the probability of success as a function of the missile flight 





case of the ground sensor guided missile when 1M =  is presented for reference.  The 
scenario is Exponential inter-firing and escape distributions with means 5 and 15 seconds 
respectively. We assume 2 ( ) 1.ground sensorp R Eσ  = = =  
 
Figure 17. Simulation estimates* for the Probability of success as a function of the 
missile flight time (in seconds) for different types of sensors ( 1)M = .** 
(Exponential case) 
* Each estimate is from a single simulation run containing a sequence of 1000 
rocket salvos. 
**To properly read this figure, print in color.  
Notice that in the exponential case, when the onboard sensor receives 10 times 
less energy than the ground sensor, there is hardly any difference between the probability 





sensor. The active sensor does do slightly better than the ground sensor for ~ 10mτ  secs. 
It seems that in this case investing in the development of an onboard sensor is not 
beneficial. 
Finally, we explore the defender’s option to wait for M detected rockets before 
launching the missile. The next 4 figures present the probability of success for the 
onboard sensor “smart” missile after different number M of detected rockets, for “Active” 
and “Passive” sensor. The scenario in 0and 0is Uniform distributions as in Figure 1 The 
scenario in Figure 20and Figure 21is Exponential inter-firing and escape time with means 
5 seconds and 15 seconds respectively. 
 
Figure 18. Simulation estimates* for the Probability of success as a function of the 
missile flight time (in seconds) for onboard “Active sensor, for different values of 
M.** (Uniform case) 
* Each estimate is from a single simulation run containing a sequence of 1000 rocket 
salvos. 
** To properly read this figure, print in color 
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Figure 19. Simulation estimates* for Probability of success as a function of the missile 
flight time (in seconds) for onboard “Passive sensor, for different  values of M.* 
(Uniform case) 
* Each estimate is from a single simulation run containing a sequence of 1000 rocket 
salvos. 
**To properly read this figure, print in color 
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Figure 20. Simulation estimates* for the Probability of success as a function of the 
missile flight time for onboard “Active sensor, for different  values of M.** 
(Exponential case) 
* Each estimate is from a single simulation run containing a sequence of 1000 rocket 
salvos. 
**To properly read this figure, print in color 
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Figure 21. Simulation estimates* for the Probability of success as a function of the 
missile flight time for onboard “Passive sensor, for different  values of M.** 
(Exponential case) 
* Each estimate is from a single simulation run containing a sequence of 1000 rocket 
salvos. 
**To properly read this figure, print in color 
 
Just as with the “dumb” and the ground sensor guided missile, the defender 
should never wait for more than  3M = detected rockets in this scenario. The black 
dotted curve is the “best policy” curve for the onboard sensor. Also plotted for reference 
are the “best policy” curves for the “dumb” and the ground sensor guided missiles. Note 
that the passive onboard sensor missile is always inferior to the ground sensor guided 
missile (under these scenarios). The “Active” onboard sensor missile does a little better 
than the ground sensor guided missile in the Uniform case, but in the Exponential case 
there is no distinguishable difference between the two. 
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IV. THE CASE OF FALSE POSITIVE DETECTIONS - A 
SIMULATION MODEL 
A. INTRODUCING FALSE DETECTIONS 
1. Assumptions 
In Chapter III, we assumed that the ground based sensor has no false positive 
detections.  In this chapter we explore how false positive detections (henceforth called, in 
short, false detections) affect our proposed tactics. 
Generally speaking, every sensor has some false detections, which may be due to 
processes internal to the sensor, or due to external conditions such as weather or 
interference caused by other systems.  In our model we assume that the times between 
two consecutive false detections are iid random variables independent of whether a rocket 
has been fired. 
We assume that only the ground sensor may have false detections. The missile’s 
onboard sensor does not have false detections. 
We assume that the ground sensor makes a measurement of the attacker’s location 
with circular normal distributed errors and variance 2σ , even when the detection is false. 
We make this assumption to simplify the simulation. Obviously, in a real-world situation 
false detections may reduce the missile’s accuracy. However this assumption still makes 
some sense. In a real situation if the false detection is extremely far away from the 
attacker’s location it will not be associated to the salvo. Furthermore, the simulation does 
handle the cases when false detections trigger a missile launch while there is no ongoing 
salvo at all. As in Chapter III , we assume that the defender launches at most one missile 
per salvo. 
2. The Firing Rule ˆ ˆ( , )M T   
In Chapter III, we assume that the defender fires back a missile as soon as he 
detects a rocket within the salvo. In the presence of false detections, such a policy may 
lead to unnecessary missile launches whenever a false detection occurs. Such missile 
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launches are disadvantageous for two reasons. First, they cause waste of missiles, which 
may be limited or expensive; and second, it may lead to unnecessary collateral damage as 
missiles may hit innocent targets. 
To mitigate the problem of unnecessary missile launches, we introduce a new 
response policy for the defender. We assume that the defender knows that the attacker 
fires his rockets in salvos of several rockets at a time. The defender takes advantage of 
this fact and estimates when a salvo has begun by looking for a series of detections close 
in time. Following such a cluster of detections, the defender makes a salvo declaration 
and fires a missile in response. Such a policy may reduce the rate of launching missiles 
unnecessarily since now only false detections which occur in close proximity will lead to 
a false salvo declaration and unnecessary missile launches.  
The firing rule is defined by the pair ˆ ˆ( , )M T   as follows: 
Looking at a sliding window in time of size Tˆ time units, the defender 
declares a salvo the moment the sliding window contains at least Mˆ detections, 
counting from the last detection accounted for by the previous salvo declaration. 
Detections from or before the previous salvo declaration are not counted to reduce 
the number of salvo declarations during the same salvo. 
We define a positive salvo declaration as a salvo declaration which is made 
during a real salvo (from the moment the attacker is in position until he has fired the last 
rocket). 
3. Problem Definition 
For Mˆ large enough and Tˆ  small enough the firing rule may reduce the number 
of false declarations, however it introduces two new problems. First, the probability of a 
positive salvo declaration is decreased and second, valuable time may be lost waiting for 
enough detections to meet the firing rule criteria, thus decreasing the probability of timely 
detection. 
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We therefore want to find the firing rule pair ˆ ˆ( , )M T which gives the best tradeoff 
between low false salvo declaration rate and high probability of success. 
B. SIMULATION DESCRIPTION 
Initial attempts to describe the problem in the presence of false detections 
analytically did not lead to tractable closed form solutions which lend insights easily. We 
therefore chose to approach the problem using discrete event simulation. 
1. Events Graphs 
To write our simulation we have used discrete event simulation (DES) 
methodology and the SimKit programming toolkit (see [10]). DES simulations maintain a 
list of scheduled events. Each event may affect system variables, schedule future events 
or, cancel future events. DES simulations are represented by events graphs. The 
following figure presents a simple example of a DES event graph. 
 
Figure 22. Event graph example 
In the simple event graph above, there are two types of events represented by 
circles: doFoo and doBar(a).  
The description of each event is described in a rectangular frame attached to the 
event by a broken line. doFoo increments the system variable numberOfFoos and 
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instantiates the variable “a”. doFoo adds “a” (received from its argument) to the system 
variable numberOfBars. The arc connecting the two events is a scheduling arc. The arc 
will schedule a doBar(a) event some time units after the execution time of doFoo. The 
time of scheduling will be determined by the distribution of tbar written next to the arc 
with no parentheses. If no time distribution is written next to the arc, the scheduled event 
will be scheduled at the same time as the scheduling event. A doBar(a) event will only be 
scheduled if the condition numberOfFoos is greater than numberOfBars, is met. The arc 
conditioning is written in parentheses next to the scheduling arc. the event doFoo passes 
the variable “a” to the event “doBar(a), written in rectangular frame next to the 
scheduling arc.  
For further reading on SimKit and DES see [10].  
2. The Simulation Model 
The following two figures present our DES event graph. Because of it size, the 














Figure 24.  Simulation event graph part B 
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C. ANALYSIS 
1. Positive Salvo Declaration as a Function of the Firing Rule ˆ ˆ( , )M T  
Our MOE is the proportion of positive salvo declarations among the total number 
of salvos. This MOE estimates the sensitivity of our firing rule – the conditional 
probability of detecting a salvo on time. We call this MOE the probability of positive 
salvo declaration. 
The scenario parameters are:  
The missile is “Dumb”. There are N = 5 rockets in the salvo. The inter-firing time 
is uniformly distributed between 4.5 to 5.5 seconds. The time to escape is uniformly 
distributed between 14 to 16 seconds; The probability of rocket detection is 0.7α = ; to 
find the conditional probability of kill we use a cookie cutter damage function with 
parameters 2 1p R= = . We assume the location estimate errors are iid circular normal 
r.v. with variance 2 1σ =  . The time between salvos, and the time between false detections 
are exponentially distributed with mean 7200 seconds (2 hours), and 900 seconds (15 
min) respectively. The missile flight time 20mτ = seconds is fixed. 




Figure 25. Simulation estimates* of the Probability of positive salvo declaration vs. Tˆ  
(in seconds) for different values of Mˆ ** 
* Each estimate is from a single simulation run containing a sequence of 1000 
rocket salvos. 
**To properly read this figure, print in color 
First, we notice that the probability of positive salvo declaration is increasing with 
Tˆ  and decreasing with Mˆ . This is the expected result; as we increase Mˆ  and reduce Tˆ  
we make our firing rule tighter. Take for instance an extreme case such as ˆ ˆ( 5, 0)M T=   . 
This is the tightest firing rule in Figure 25, and we see the probability of positive salvo 
declaration is zero. On the other hand, ˆ ˆ( 2, 40)M T= =  is almost the least tight firing rule 
in the figure. We see the probability of positive salvo declaration is almost one. 
When ˆ( 1)M = , the probability of positive salvo declaration is of course one. 
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Finally, we observe that for a given value of Mˆ  increasing Tˆ  indefinitely 
(supposedly making the firing rule infinitely lenient), does not lead to positive salvo 
declaration probability of one. Instead the probability increases with Tˆ  and then stays 
fixed on a certain value. This phenomenon is due to the fact that in counting detections 
for the next salvo declaration, we discard detections used for previous salvo declarations. 
This is equivalent to saying that detections that generate one salvo declaration may not 
overlap with detections generating the next salvo declaration. As we increase Tˆ  we do 
initially make the firing rule less demanding; however at a certain point it becomes more 
and more likely that the time window will include detections from a set that resulted in a 
previous salvo declaration. From this point on increasing Tˆ will not make any difference 
since any detection further back in time is ignored when counting detections for the next 
salvo declaration. The rate of positive salvo declarations will then become fixed 
regardless of any increase of Tˆ . This in turn leads to a fixed probability of positive salvo 
declarations. 
2. False Salvo Declaration as a Function of the Firing Rule ˆ ˆ( , )M T  
The MOE for the false declarations is the ratio between the number of false salvo 
declarations and the number of total salvo declarations (including duplicate positive 
declarations of the same salvo). We call this MOE the false declaration proportion 
(FDP). Another MOE is the false declarations rate (FDR) – the number of false 
declarations per unit time (FDR). Figure 26and Figure 27present the simulation estimates 
for the FDP and the overall rate of false salvo declarations. 
The scenario parameters are as in 0 
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Figure 26. Simulation estimates* of FDP vs. ˆ ˆ( , )M T  ** 
* Each estimate is from a single simulation run containing a sequence of 1000 
rocket salvos. 
**To properly read this figure, print in color 
The area circled in red on Figure 26shows non-monotonic behavior and missing 
points. This area, having the tightest firing rules, has a very low rate of salvo declarations 
(false or positive). The low rate of declarations (see next figure for the rate of false 
declarations) makes the statistics highly variable, and in some cases the ratio cannot be 
computed at all as there are no declarations during the run. This makes exploring the 
region of low false declaration probability hard to do.  
Figure 27presents an MOE which may be more useful operationally - the number 
of false salvo declarations per unit time (Hour) - FDR. This translates to the rate of 




Figure 27. Simulation estimates* FDR  vs. ˆ ˆ( , )M T ** 
* Each estimate is from a single simulation run containing a sequence of 1000 
rocket salvos. 
**To properly read this figure, print in color 
3. Results of the Base Case Scenario 
Dumb missile 
Figure 28, Figure 28and Figure 29present the probability of success the FDR and 
FDP for different firing rule pairs ˆ ˆ( , )M T . The missile is “Dumb” and the scenario is as 
in Figure 25 
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The probability of success is defined here as in Chapter III. The simulation 
estimate for the probability of success is the ratio between the number of salvos the 
attacker has been killed and the total number of salvos. 
 
Figure 28. Simulation estimates* for the Probability of success vs. Tˆ (in seconds) for 
different values of Mˆ (“Dumb” missile)** 
* Each estimate is from a single simulation run containing a sequence of 1000 
rocket salvos. 
**To properly read this figure, print in color. 
 59
 
Figure 29. Simulation estimates* of FDR vs. Tˆ (in seconds) for different values of Mˆ ** 
* Each estimate is from a single simulation run containing a sequence of 1000 
rocket salvos. 
**To properly read this figure, print in color. 
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Figure 30. Simulation estimates* of FDP vs. Tˆ  (in seconds) for different values of Mˆ ** 
* Each estimate is from a single simulation run containing a sequence of 1000 
rocket salvos. 
**To properly read this figure, print in color. 
For clarity of presentation only the cases ˆ 2M ≥  are presented in Figure 28. We 
can see in Figure 27 that for the case ˆ 1M =  the value of FDR is simply the rate of false 
detections as expected. We have not defined the defender’s acceptable value of FDR, but 
it seems obvious that choosing ˆ 1M = (effectively responding to the first detection) is 
unacceptable due to the high value of FDR [ / ](4 )FD Hr . The highest probability of success 
(~0.55) may be achieved when ˆ 2M =  however when ˆ 2M = there is still a significant 
FDR. Since the FDR is monotone increasing with Tˆ , we may want to choose Tˆ slightly 
above 5 seconds. This will give the lowest value of FDR possible [ / ](0.02 )FD Hr for a non 
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zero probability of success (~0.45).  Alternatively the defender may decide to settle for 
lower probability of success and choose ˆ ˆ( 3, 10)M T=  > . The FDR is then close to zero 
[ / ]( 0.005 )FD Hr< and the probability of success between 0.3 and 0.4. 
Method 1: Ground Sensor Guided Missile 
The following figure presents the simulation estimates of the probability of 
success for the ground sensor guided missile. The rest of the scenario is as in Figure 28 
 
Figure 31. Simulation estimates* of the Probability of success for vs. Tˆ (in seconds) for 
different values of Mˆ (“Smart” ground sensor guided missile)** 
* Each estimate is from a single simulation run containing a sequence of 1000 
rocket salvos. 
**To properly read this figure, print in color. 
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Changing the missile type does not influence the FDR therefore we may still refer 
to Figure 28and Figure 27for the FDR. The most significant difference from Figure 28is 
in the curves for ˆ 1M = and ˆ 2M = which reach considerably higher values. However this 
does not change the defender’s decision considerably; the defender still has only two 
viable options ˆ 2M = and ˆ 3M = . The defender may be more inclined to choose ˆ 2M =  
because of the increase in the probability of success. 
Method 2; Onboard sensor Guided Missile 
The following figure presents the probability of success for the onboard sensor 
guided missile; the sensor is “Passive” and receives 10 times less energy than the ground 
sensor. The rest of the scenario is as in Figure 28 
 
Figure 32. Simulation estimates* of Probability of success for vs. Tˆ for different values 
of Mˆ (“Smart” onboard “Passive” sensor guided missile)** 
* Each estimate is from a single simulation run containing a sequence of 1000 
rocket salvos. 
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**To properly read this figure, print in color. 
Changing the missile type does not influence the FDP therefore we may still refer 
to Figure 28and Figure 27for the FDP. Changing from the “dumb” missile to an onboard 
“Passive” sensor missile does not affect the defender’s decision at all. It seems the only 
difference between Figure 28and Figure 32is in the curve for ˆ 1M = which is not an 
option because of the high FDR.  
It seems given only these three options that the defender would choose to use the 
ground sensor guided missile, possibly using the firing rule pair ˆ ˆ( 3, 10)M T=  > . 
4. The Effect of the False Detection Rate 
No False detections 
Let us first look at the extreme case where the rate of false detections is zero. The 
following figure presents the simulation estimates for the probability of positive salvo 
declaration when there are no false detections (False detections are simply not scheduled 
in these simulation runs). Although there are no false detections the defender still 
implements the same firing rule. The rest of the scenario is the same as in Figure 28 Each 




Figure 33. Simulation estimates* of Probability of positive salvo declaration vs. Tˆ for 
different values of Mˆ . No false detections ** 
* Each estimate is from a single simulation run containing a sequence of 1000 
rocket salvos. 
**To properly read this figure, print in color. 
When ˆ 1M = , the probability of positive salvo declaration is always 1. For ˆ 1M >  
we notice there are sudden increases in the probability as Tˆ is increased. Take for 
example the case where ˆ 2M = . Recall the inter-firing time is uniformly distributed 
between 4.5 and 5.5 seconds. Therefore when the decision variable ˆ 4.5T <  seconds, 
there is no combination of detected rockets within the salvo that can generate a salvo 
declaration. Any two detected rockets will be detected at a greater time interval than Tˆ . 
However once ˆ 5.5T > , every two consecutive detected rockets will fall within the time 
interval Tˆ and therefore will trigger a salvo declaration. Notice that the first increase in 
the probability of salvo declaration for ˆ 2M =  is about equal to the probability of 
detecting any combination containing at least two consecutive detected rockets, given 
by: 5 5 2 3 3 21 (1 ) 5 (1 ) 6 (1 ) (1 ) 0.8859P α α α α α α α= − − − ⋅ ⋅ − − ⋅ ⋅ − − ⋅ − = . As we increase 
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Tˆ more combinations of detected rockets may generate a salvo declaration and so the 
probability of salvo declaration increases. The maximal probability of salvo declaration 
for ˆ 2M =  (given when ˆ 20T > ) is about .997 which corresponds to one minus the 
probability of that no rocket is detected in the salvo given by: 51 (1 ) 0.9976P α= − − =  , 
the only combination which will not trigger a salvo declaration when ˆ 2M = , ˆ 20T > . 
High Rate of False Detections 
Let us now explore the effect of increasing the ground sensor’s rate of false 
detections. The following figure presents the probability of success and the FDP. The 
mean time between false detection is 60 seconds. The rest of the scenario is the same as 
in Figure 28  
 
Figure 34. Simulation estimates* for the Probability of success vs. Tˆ (in seconds) for 
different values of Mˆ (“Dumb” missile).High rate of false detections ** 
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Figure 35. Simulation estimates* of FDP vs. Tˆ (in seconds) for different values of Mˆ .  
High rate of false detections ** 
* Each estimate is from a single simulation run containing a sequence of 1000 
rocket salvos. 
**To properly read these figures, print in color. 
Increasing the rate of false detections increases the FDP (compare to Figure 26). 
False detections are the cause for false salvo declaration and so this result is expected.  
Comparing Figure 34to Figure 28  we see that the probability of success is increased as 
well (this is most obvious when ˆ 5M = ). To understand the contribution of false 
detections to the probability of success, think of the case when ˆ 4M = . When ˆ 4M =  and 
in the absence of false detections, the firing rule demands for 4 rockets to be detected. 
The probability of this event is not very high 
4 5 4 5( (1 ) 5 0.7 0.3 0.7 0.52)N α α α⋅ ⋅ − + = ⋅ ⋅ + ≅ . Furthermore in the uniform distribution 
case, if the decision variable Tˆ is low enough there will never be enough time for all 4 
rockets to be fired within Tˆ . This reduces further the probability of salvo declaration. 
Indeed we see that in figure Figure 28when ˆ 4M =  and ˆ ˆ( 1) 15fT M μ< − ⋅ =  then the 
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probability of success is close to zero.  However in the presence of false detections, fewer 
than 4 rockets in the salvo need to be detected for a salvo to be declared. Therefore 
increasing the rate of false detections increases the probability of salvo declaration and in 
turn the probability of success.  Notice for ˆ 4M = and ˆ10 15T< <  in Figure 34 the 
probability of success is significant and not close to zero as in Figure 28 We learn from 
this discussion that the probability of success presented in Chapter III with no false 
detections, gives a lower bound on the maximal probability of success over Tˆ  for the 
case with false detections. 
FDP has sudden drops at some values of Tˆ . These drops correspond to sudden 
increases in the probability of success. As we have seen earlier increasing Tˆ allows more 
combinations of detected rockets in the salvo to generate a salvo declaration. This 
suddenly increases the rate of positive salvo declaration but only slightly changes the rate 
of false salvo declarations. The net result is a sudden drop in the FDP. 
The “wild” swings in the FDP for low values of Tˆ when ˆ 5M = are due to 
simulation variability as explained in 4.C.2. 
5.  The Effect of the Missile Flight Time 
The response of the probability of success to variations in the missile flight time 
has been shown in Chapter III in the case with no false detections. We have already 
concluded that the results in Chapter III give a lower bound on the maximal probability 
of success (over Tˆ ) with false detections. For relatively low rate of false detections, we 
expect the maximal values of the probability of success to be close to the ones in the case 
with no false detections. For instance, in Figure 28the maximal probability of success 
when ˆ 2M = is about 0.55. Comparison of  this value to the probability of success when 
ˆ 2M = and 20mτ = in Figure 7shows they are about the same. We can repeat this exercise 
for any value of Mˆ and for any type of missile (comparing Figure 11to Figure 31 and, 
Figure 19 to Figure 32) We demonstrate this one more time by changing the missile flight 
time to 2mτ =  and again comparing with Figure 7 
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Figure 36. Simulation estimates* of Probability of success for vs. Tˆ for different values 
of Mˆ (“Dumb” missile). 2mτ = ** 
* Each estimate is from a single simulation run containing a sequence of 1000 
rocket salvos. 
**To properly read this figure, print in color. 
6. The Effect of the Salvos Rate 
Let us now explore the effect of increasing the rate of salvos. The following two 
figures present estimates of the probability of success and the FDP. Each estimate is from 
a single simulation run containing a sequence of 1000 rocket salvos. The mean time 
between salvos is 900 seconds (15 minutes), a substantial decrease from 2 hours. The rest 
of the scenario is the same as in Figure 28  
Figure 37and Figure 28are the same. Increasing the salvo rate does not change the 
probability of success. Comparing Figure 37and Figure 29we notice the FDP drops 
dramatically. Recall the definition of a false salvo declaration basically says a false salvo 
declaration is a salvo declaration which occurs during the time between salvos. 
Decreasing the mean time between salvos means that for a given time interval during the 
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simulation run, there would be on average more salvos and less time during which false 
salvos may occur. Since the firing rule is unchanged the rate of positive salvo 
declarations during the salvo and the rate of false salvo declaration between salvos are 
unchanged. Overall the simulation run will have more positive salvo declarations and less 
false salvo declarations. The net result is a lower FDP. It is interesting to note that 
although the FDR has not changed the FDP has changed. If the defender is more 
concerned with the ratio of false to positive salvo declarations rather than the rate of false 
salvo declarations per unit time, he may choose a less conservative firing rule under a 
more intensive rocket attack. In other words when the attacker shoots more salvos, the 
defender may become more “happy trigger”. This last observation means that when the 
rate of salvo is higher, the defender may choose a more lenient firing rule. Perhaps in the 
case above the defender will choose ˆ ˆ( 2, 6)M T= = .  
 70
 
Figure 37. Simulation estimates* of the Probability of success for vs. Tˆ (in seconds) for 
different values of Mˆ (“Dumb” missile) High salvo rate** 
 
Figure 38. Simulation estimates* of the FDP vs. Tˆ (in seconds) for different values of 
Mˆ High salvo rate ** 
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* Each estimate is from a single simulation run containing a sequence of 1000 
rocket salvos. 
**To properly read these figures, print in color. 
7. The Exponential Case 
We now explore the case where the inter-firing time and escape time are 
exponentially distributed. The following two figures present the probability of success 
and the FDP. The inter-firing time and escape time are exponentially distributed with 
means 5 and 15 seconds respectively. The rest of the scenario is the same as in Figure 28 
Comparing the exponential case to the uniform case (Figure 28and Figure 28), we 
notice how in the exponential case the curves become smoother and have no sharp drops 
or increases as in the uniform case. The FDP does not present non monotone behavior 
when mτ  is very low. In the exponential case the probability of success is never zero no 
matter how demanding the firing rule is. Comparing Figure 39to Figure 9we can see 
again how the maximal probability of success over Tˆ  corresponds to the values of the 




Figure 39. Simulation estimates* of the Probability of success for vs. Tˆ for different 
values of Mˆ (“Dumb” missile) Exponential case** 
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Figure 40. Simulation estimates* of FDP vs. Tˆ for different values of Mˆ  
Exponential case ** 
* Each estimate is from a single simulation run containing a sequence of 1000 
rocket salvos. 
**To properly read these figures, print in color. 
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V. SUMMARY 
In this thesis, we have explored and discussed tactical considerations in 
countering mortar and rocket fire, when the enemy has adopted a “shoot and scoot” 
tactic. 
The probability of success – the probability of a timely effective hit of the attacker 
– is used as the MOE for the defender’s effectiveness. We have used the probability of 
false salvo declaration proportion (FDP) and the false salvo declarations rate (FDR) as 
MOEs for the defender’s chances of mistakenly firing a missile and increasing the 
collateral damage. 
We have developed a tool for comparing different defender tactics and responses 
(firing rules). In Chapter III, we have used an analytic model under the assumption that 
there are no false detections (and hence zero FDP and FDR). This analytic model allowed 
us to quantify the defenders dilemma between waiting, gathering more information and 
increasing accuracy, and responding early at the expense of more information and with 
less accuracy. 
The analytic model presented how the probability of success depends on the 
sensor’s probability of rocket detection, the missile flight time and the attacker’s inter-
firing and escape time distributions.  
We have explored a suggested new tactic where the defender launches his missile 
as soon as possible based on a rough estimate of the attacker’s location. The missile’s 
trajectory is later corrected and updated while the missile is airborne, using ground sensor 
guidance or different types of onboard sensors. The effectiveness of the suggested tactic 
depends on the parameters of the scenario; however it is most useful when the missile 
flight time is long compared to the mean salvo length and escape time. 
In Chapter IV, we have introduced false detections to the model. To deal with this 
predicament we have built a simulation. The defender’s firing rule has been extended to 
account for false detections by introducing a sliding time window. The problem in 
Chapter IV was to find a firing rule which gives the highest possible probability of 
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success while keeping FDP and FDR as low as possible. It surprising to note that 
presence of false detections, actually contributes the defender’s probability of success. 
This happens because false detections trigger the defender to launch his missile in cases 
he otherwise wouldn’t have, even though a salvo is ongoing (e.g. no rockets were 
detected). Of course this improvement comes at the cost of mistakenly firing missiles 
causing collateral damage. 
We discussed the simulation results for a base case and varied the rate of salvos 
the rate of false detections and the missile flight time for sensitivity analysis. 
Follow-on research may include taking the salvo rate, inter-firing and escape time 
distributions from real life data and exploring the ideas presented in this paper on that 
data.  It would also be interesting to survey existing weapons and sensors and their 





Although the results for the Normal case are very similar to the results of the 
Uniform case, we present here for the purpose of completeness our results for the case 
where the inter-firing and escape time are Normally distributed.   
There are N = 5 rockets in the salvo. The inter-firing time is normally distributed 
with mean 5 seconds and variance 21 sec
12
. The time to escape is normally distributed 
with mean 15 seconds and variance 21 sec
3
. Notice that the inter firing and escape time 
variances and means are the same as in Figure 1The rest of the scenario is as in Figure 1  
 
 
Figure 41. Probability of success for different missile flight times 
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Figure 42. Probability of a timely hit for different missile flight times and number of 
residual rockets* 
* To properly read this figure, print in color.  
As mentioned above comparing Figure 1and Figure 2with Figure 41and Figure 
42We see that the results for the Normal case are very similar to the results of the 
Uniform case. 
0 Rockets left 
4 Rockets left 
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